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The unemployment rate is proving to be the key manifestation of the severity of the crisis af-
fecting the Spanish economy. According to EPA (Spanish Labour Force Survey) data, the un-
employment rate rose from 9.6% at the beginning of 2008 to 17.9% in 2009 Q2, topping the 
4 million mark.1 The rate of job destruction is higher than in other developed countries, even 
taking into account some of the singularities of the Spanish case. Thus, in countries facing a 
similar contraction in activity, but with a lower rate of growth in the labour force and with no 
comparable construction sector expansion, the unemployment rate has risen only slightly 
since the start of 2008 (for example, in France, by 1.3 pp according to Eurostat) or has even 
remained stable (for example, in Germany), although unemployment will foreseeably rise in 
these countries in coming quarters. However, when compared with countries that share similar 
characteristics in terms of property market developments and demographic trends, such as 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Ireland, Spain’s unemployment growth continues 
to stand out: the unemployment rate has risen by “just” 4 pp in the United States, slightly more 
than in the United Kingdom, and by 6.4 pp in Ireland, as opposed to more than 8 pp in 
Spain.
This suggests that the Spanish labour market’s mechanisms for adjustment in the face of ad-
verse shocks are not functioning correctly, as employment is bearing the brunt of the adjust-
ment and this entails a high cost, in terms of long-term economic growth and social well-being. 
Moreover, these distortions are not only seen in periods of recession, but also in economic 
expansion phases, in the form of highly temporary and precarious employment, low productiv-
ity and real wage growth and an unemployment rate that has failed to converge with that of the 
euro area countries. These shortcomings in the functioning of the labour market refl ect, inter 
alia, a lack of adaptation of the institutional framework. When it comes to determining how the 
labour market functions and its capacity to adjust in the face of serious macroeconomic shocks, 
there are four key labour market institutions: unemployment protection schemes, understood 
in the broadest sense (including unemployment benefi ts and severance payments); wage-setting 
mechanisms (the collective bargaining system); active labour market policies (designed to raise 
the employability of the labour force); and labour market intermediation mechanisms (the agen-
cies that help match persons looking for work with fi rms offering work).
The fact that employment is bearing the brunt of the adjustment is probably chiefl y due to the 
fi rst two of these institutions, i.e. the unemployment protection schemes and the wage-setting 
mechanisms.2 Moreover, several studies have demonstrated that the interaction between 
these two institutions is also key to understanding the labour market’s reaction to shocks:3 in 
fact it is clear that protection systems may affect the result of collective bargaining, and vice 
versa, that the degree of wage adjustment in light of a shock makes it essential for unemploy-
Introduction
1. To give an idea of the magnitude of the problem, it should be noted that, in like-for-like terms, the all-time high for 
Spanish unemployment was 18.2% in 1994 Q3, although as it was then calculated, the unemployment rate reached 
24.5%. 2. This does not mean that the role of the other two institutions is insignifi cant. In fact Denmark is the most 
paradigmatic example of the effectiveness of powerful active and well-designed labour market policies and of the im-
portant role public and private employment services can play to prevent the unemployed from becoming 
stigmatised. 3. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) analyse the importance of the interaction between labour market institu-
tions and different economic shocks for analysis of labour market behaviour. 
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ment protection schemes to come into play. In this respect, the reasons that warrant the exist-
ence of these labour market institutions should not be forgotten: they provide guaranteed in-
come for workers (who are thus able to maintain a more stable spending profi le over time), 
they transfer part of the risk from individuals to fi rms, they oblige fi rms to assume the social 
cost of worker dismissals, they enable the unemployed to fi nd work more suited to their skills 
and they balance the bargaining power of workers and fi rms, inter alia. All this explains why 
these institutions must be well designed, to ensure that labour market adjustments are effi cient 
and entail the lowest possible social and economic cost. However, it should also be borne in 
mind that for these design improvements to yield optimum results, fi rms will have to operate in 
a more competitive environment on the product markets, to ensure that the consequent de-
cline in corporate margins is passed through to fi nal consumers.
Accordingly, the next two sections of this article contain an overview of the existing unemploy-
ment protection and wage-setting institutions in Spain, placing them in an international context 
and aiming to identify their main shortcomings. There follows a review of some of the labour 
market reforms undertaken in other European countries that may serve as a reference frame-
work for Spain. In particular, Germany and Austria made extensive changes to the design of 
their unemployment protection schemes in the 1990s and are, for the time being, demonstrat-
ing considerable resilience to unemployment growth, while Sweden is a paradigmatic example 
of how a collective bargaining system mid-way between past excessive centralisation and 
wage bargaining at company level may have an adverse impact on unemployment. Finally, the 
last section summarises the main conclusions.
Most developed countries operate a combination of two basic mechanisms to ensure that 
workers receive income throughout their working lives and to enable them, if made redundant, 
to secure a new job that matches their skills, namely severance pay and unemployment ben-
efi ts. In Spain, the Workers’ Statute contains the regulations on severance pay following termi-
nation of a permanent employment contract. In simplifi ed terms, there are two channels that 
fi rms may use to dismiss individual employees: objective reasons (Articles 52 and 53 of the 
Statute) or disciplinary grounds (Articles 54 and 55). In either case, if an appeal is fi led, an em-
ployment tribunal may declare the dismissals to be fair, unfair or null and void. In the case of 
dismissals for objective reasons, fi rms must give employees one month’s notice and severance 
pay amounting to 20 days’ salary per year worked, up to a maximum of 12 months’ pay; if the 
dismissal is subsequently declared to be unfair, employees will be entitled to 45 days’ salary per 
year worked, up to a maximum of 42 months’ pay. In 1997 this was reduced to 33 days’ sal-
ary per year worked, up to a maximum of 24 months’ pay, for certain groups of workers via the 
creation of the permanent employment-promoting contract. Dismissals on disciplinary grounds 
are effective immediately and grant no entitlement to severance pay if they are considered fair; 
if they are deemed unfair by the tribunal, in this case also employees will be entitled to 45 days’ 
salary per year worked, up to a maximum of 42 months’ pay.4 Lastly, should the tribunal rule 
that the workers have been discriminated against and that the dismissals, whether for objective 
reasons or on disciplinary grounds, are null and void, the employees must be readmitted.
To place these fi gures in an international context, the data compiled by the World Bank for its 
Doing Business Index is used, given the uniformity between countries.5 In these statistics, the 
Employment protection
in Spain. The effects of 
excessive labour market 
segmentation
4. By contrast to the case of dismissals for objective reasons, the permanent employment-promoting contracts brought 
no changes in these conditions. 5. Specifi cally, one of the components of this Index refl ects the cost of termination for 
economic reasons (corresponding to termination for objective reasons in the Spanish system) of the contract of a 42-year 
old, full-time, non-management employee, with 20 years’ service, earning the national average wage, in a company with 
201 employees, in the manufacturing industry, which is subject to a collective bargaining agreement (even if it takes no 
direct part in the bargaining process). 
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cost of dismissal in Spain in 2008 was 56 weeks’ pay, based on fair dismissal, for objective 
reasons, of an employee with 20 years’ service. As Table 1 shows, this sum is more than dou-
ble the average for the countries of the OECD (25.8 weeks). In fact, only four developed coun-
tries top this fi gure: Germany, Portugal, Korea and Turkey. Nevertheless, these fi gures may 
possibly not be an adequate refl ection of effective severance payments in Spain, as most 
terminations of contracts are made, not for objective reasons that are considered fair, but on 
disciplinary grounds that are subsequently considered unfair. In this case, for the employee 
considered in the World Bank’s Index, the cost of dismissal would be 128 weeks’ pay, far 
higher than that of any of the other countries analysed.
Unfortunately in Spain there is no accurate information available on fi nal rulings on terminations 
of contracts. However, from a number of approximations it is possible to affi rm that the great 
majority of permanent contracts terminated in Spain grant entitlement to maximum severance 
(45 days’ pay per year worked). In fact, combining the information on individuals accessing 
unemployment benefi ts by source of entitlement with the judicial statistics on worker dismis-
sals, it may be seen that fi rms acknowledge from the outset that dismissals are unfair6 in slight-
ly more than 70% of cases, and that of the cases that go to employment tribunals (the remain-
ing 30%), approximately 30% result in agreed settlements and more than 20% in rulings 
favourable to the workers. Accordingly, the proportion of permanent contracts terminated in 
Spain that grant entitlement to the maximum severance pay established in the Workers’ Stat-
ute may be close to 90%.7
In any case, it is important to note that this legislation only affects employees with permanent 
contracts, who represent approximately 70% of Spanish dependent employees. By contrast, 
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SOURCE: Doing Business (World Bank).
6. Under Law 45/2002, fi rms are no longer obliged to pay wages between the date of dismissal and the date of the 
conciliation hearing, in cases in which they acknowledge that dismissal on disciplinary grounds, as of the date thereof, is 
unfair and they grant the workers the corresponding severance pay. 7. There is no detailed information on severance 
payments made in the case of redundancy programmes; however, even in the present circumstances, these programmes 
affect only a very small percentage of workers. 
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employees with casual contracts or with contracts for specifi c tasks or services that are not 
renewed are entitled to just eight days’ pay per year worked, or 22 weeks’ pay in the terms of 
the World Bank’s Index (were it possible for a temporary employee to have 20 years’ service 
in one company). Employees with other types of temporary contracts (around 20% of the total 
or 1.2 million people) have no entitlement to severance pay when their contracts end. This 
would place all employees without permanent contracts below the OECD average, in a com-
parable position to all dependent employees in the Czech Republic or the United Kingdom, 
where workers without permanent contracts account for just 9% and 6%, respectively, of the 
total.
In most countries, unemployment benefi ts, the second institution providing income for work-
ers who lose their jobs, are managed by the public sector and fi nanced by fi rms’ and workers’ 
contributions. They are generally defi ned by two parameters: their maximum duration and the 
percentage of salary they represent. However, the system is generally somewhat more com-
plex, as there are fl oors and ceilings on the benefi ts effectively received, the benefi ts may de-
cline over time and certain groups of workers may be entitled to unemployment assistance 
when their unemployment insurance is exhausted. Given these complexities, to place Spain 
among the developed countries, Table 2 shows the average percentage of salary that unem-
ployment benefi ts represent for persons who were earning 67%, 100% and 150% of the aver-
age wage in the economy before becoming unemployed and who have been unemployed for 
less than a year.
From the table, Spain looks to be one of the OECD countries with the most generous unem-
ployment benefi ts in relative terms, almost 5 pp above the OECD average. However, as in the 
case of severance payments, these fi gures may be misleading as a result of labour market 
segmentation. In effect, as temporary workers become unemployed more often, they accumu-
late fewer rights, and this drives down the effective replacement ratio. Taking this into account, 
Spanish temporary workers rank below the OECD average, with a level of protection slightly 
below that of the United States.
Rep eRoitartnemecal placement ratio
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Thus, combining the data contained in Tables 1 and 2 and adding in the disaggregation between 
permanent and temporary workers in the case of Spain, the developed countries may be plotted 
in the four quadrants shown in Chart 1, according to the different combinations of these two in-
stitutions for worker protection. The chart clearly illustrates the duality in the Spanish labour mar-
ket, as Spain appears in two opposing quadrants: on the one hand, Spanish workers with tem-
porary contracts appear among the countries with severance pay and unemployment benefi ts 
below the OECD average, along with all the Anglo-Saxon countries, while Spanish workers with 
permanent contracts appear among the countries with severance pay and unemployment ben-
efi ts above the OECD average, along with Portugal and Germany, inter alia. In the other two 
quadrants, the Nordic countries (specifi cally, Denmark and Norway) stand out, as unemployment 
benefi ts are above average but severance pay has virtually been eliminated, as do Turkey and 
Korea, for the opposite reason, as severance pay is high but unemployment benefi ts are low.
This excessive segmentation of the labour market is a result of the introduction, in 1984, of the 
temporary contract allowing unrestricted dismissal. Very likely this was the only way, without 
modifying the terms of stable contracts, to encourage job creation by reducing severance pay-
ments – in fact they were almost eliminated completely – for new hires, at a time when the 
unemployment rate was rising sharply and the majority of those who had lost their jobs were 
facing long-term unemployment. This reform helped reduce the numbers of long-term unem-
ployed and helped new groups of workers enter the labour market. It also increased labour 
mobility, permitting reallocation of workers, from sectors in decline to up-and-coming sectors, 
at a time of large-scale restructuring of numerous industrial sectors. However, the continued 
coexistence of two forms of employment contracts with such big differences in terms of em-
ployment protection has resulted in excessive labour market segmentation and this is having 
an adverse effect on the functioning of the labour market, especially because, in the face of 
any kind of economic shock, it passes the burden of adjustment by fi rms on to employment, 
and particularly temporary employment.8
Thus, as Chart 2 shows, labour mobility is concentrated, almost exclusively, on workers with 
temporary contracts. Accordingly, even at times of economic expansion, these workers are 
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8. In fact, the aim of almost all the labour reforms introduced in recent years (most notably in 1997, 2001 and 2006) has 
been precisely to reduce the duality in the labour market, endeavouring to encourage permanent hires. 
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much more likely to become unemployed than permanent workers (in fact approximately 8% 
of temporary workers in one quarter become unemployed in the next). In turn, the unemployed 
who fi nd work are most likely to be offered temporary contracts. In addition, it is very rare for 
workers with permanent contracts to change jobs, thus limiting the potential productivity gains 
stemming from labour mobility. This concentration of fl exibility on a specifi c group of workers 
also leads to excessive turnover, as temporary workers combine very short periods of work 
with repeat episodes of unemployment, thus further detracting from productivity.9 Finally, in 
the face of a crisis such as the present one, and as the chart also shows, the intense employ-
ment adjustment experienced in the Spanish economy is restricted almost exclusively to tem-
porary workers, whose employment exit rates have doubled in recent quarters, while those of 
permanent workers have barely changed. Although it is highly probable that more permanent 
employees will eventually be dismissed, the workers with the most precarious employment 
conditions and who, in addition, are less well protected against this eventuality, are bearing the 
bulk of the adjustment.
Overall, therefore, as it stands, the labour market presents serious operating ineffi ciencies that 
amplify the effect of economic shocks – however short-lived – as too much of the impact is 
passed through to employment levels. As Table 3 shows, this results in higher employment 
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9. See, for example, Blanchard and Landier (2002) for theoretical models of these effects. 
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volatility relative to GDP in Spain in comparison with other developed countries. This tends to 
amplify economic fl uctuations and is a consequence, in part, of the scant sensitivity of real 
wages to cyclical economic conditions. In fact, as the table shows, Spain is the only country 
in which, on average, real wages per capita tend to rise in recessions and fall in growth phases, 
exacerbating the employment adjustment in the event of a demand shock. Moreover, Spain is 
also the only country in which the correlation between hours worked and the cyclical compo-
nent of activity is lower than the correlation between employment and said cyclical com ponent, 
suggesting that fewer hours are worked per capita in growth phases and more hours per 
capita in recessions, which goes against the aim of achieving stable employment.
This recourse to external fl exibility, rather than internal fl exibility in the form of adjustments in 
the number of hours worked or in wages, has a major impact on the pattern of economic 
adjustment in the face of a shock of any kind, as it immediately results in changes in numbers 
employed and, therefore, in unemployment. This has an evident social cost for those who lose 
their jobs and for society as a whole, but it also has a signifi cant impact on agents’ confi dence, 
as unemployment is the key determinant of household expectations.
Moreover, from a long-term view, this segmentation of the labour market has a negative impact 
on incentives for workers to accumulate human capital and for fi rms to provide training. This is 
vital, as workers’ human capital, that is, their training and skills, are clearly their best protection 
in the event of economic slowdown. It is common knowledge that the most highly-trained seg-
ments of the population enjoy not only higher wages but also lower unemployment, even 
though they represent a higher proportion of the participation rate. The link between labour 
market segmentation and investment in human capital stems from the fact that temporary 
workers currently lack the necessary incentives to acquire company-specifi c knowledge in the 
fi rms in which they work, considering the high probability that in a few months’ time they may 
have changed or lost their jobs. Firms are likewise reluctant to invest in effective training for 
temporary workers, in light of the risk that this training may benefi t their competitors.10 More-
over, in some cases this may also have an adverse impact on permanent workers, for whom the 
US Germany France UK Italy Spain Sweden
Volatility relative to GDP
Total hours worked 0.96 0.75 1.25 1.46 0.82 1.67 1.01
10.114.168.060.107.087.017.0tnemyolpmE
Correlations with GDP
Total hours worked 0.88 0.81 0.39 0.72 0.32 0.70 0.84
87.098.023.027.018.007.058.0tnemyolpmE
41.011.0-30.0-05.070.0-91.007.0atipacrepsruoH
10.072.0-72.011.012.024.025.0atipacrepegaW
50.0-41.0-42.091.0-12.093.091.0egawylruoH
VOLATILITY RATIOS RELATIVE TO GDP AND CORRELATIONS (a) TABLE 3
SOURCES: Eurostat and Banco de España.
a. Correlations and volatilities are calculated on the cyclical component of each series.
10. Albert et al (2005) show that temporary workers are less likely to obtain employment in fi rms that offer training to their 
employees, and that those who do so are less likely to receive this training. Also in this respect, Dolado and Stuchi (2008) 
fi nd that temporary employment has an adverse effect on productivity growth, especially in fi rms that employ a high 
proportion of temporary workers. 
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fact of being seemingly protected from fl uctuations in activity may reduce the incentives for 
them to undertake on-the-job training. 
Lastly, the duality in the Spanish labour market is particularly damaging for certain groups of work-
ers, fundamentally new market entrants such as young people, women and immigrants. This 
causes signifi cant problems of equity, as these workers bear the brunt of market adjustments. 
This would be less of a problem if temporary workers soon became permanent workers, that is, 
if temporary employment was a gateway into the labour market, ahead of transition to improved 
employment conditions. However, the evidence shows that this transition is very slow, and that a 
considerable percentage of temporary workers remain trapped. In effect, as Chart 311 shows, 
more than 80% of workers start their working lives with a temporary contract. This percentage 
declines over time, but very slowly. Thus, after ten years in the labour market, 40% of workers still 
have temporary contracts. This appears to be the consequence of the huge difference between 
severance pay in temporary and permanent contracts, which becomes a decisive factor in fi rms’ 
decisions to offer permanent contracts to temporary workers.
Clearly this does not affect all workers alike; in effect, it is the less-privileged and less-skilled 
workers who endure precarious employment conditions for longer. As the right-hand side of 
Chart 3 shows, the higher the level of educational attainment, the lower the probability of start-
ing out with a temporary contract. Furthermore, the transition period is much longer for work-
ers with a lower level of educational attainment, although in no case is the move to permanent 
employment particularly quick. And it is a considerable problem, as even in the case of engi-
neers and graduates, 20% still have temporary contracts ten years after starting work.12
The economic literature generally uses three indicators to assess the economic impact of col-
lective bargaining on the labour market: coverage, degree of coordination and level of cen-
tralisation. Union density, that is, the proportion of workers with trade union affi liation, is the 
most straightforward approximation to coverage, as workers are formally represented by trade 
unions in the collective bargaining process. However, there are reasons to believe that this 
Collective bargaining
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11. Compiled using data on the working lives of men who started work in 1986. 12. Toharia and Cebrián (2008) con-
duct a highly detailed analysis of the problem of the temporary employment trap for different groups of workers. Their 
results show that a high percentage of the population (approximately one third) remain in this trap for some time, with 
disastrous consequences, for example, for Social Security contribution levels, as temporary employment goes hand in 
hand with frequent episodes of unemployment. 
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approximation underestimates coverage, due to the existence (as in Spain) of legal mecha-
nisms that extend these agreements to workers or their representatives who have not neces-
sarily taken part in the bargaining process. Accordingly, collective bargaining coverage, which 
measures the proportion of workers whose wages are set by the process, is generally used as 
an additional yardstick.
As Chart 4 illustrates, Spain, together with France, is one of the economies with the lowest 
union density and the highest collective bargaining coverage (between 80% and 90% of Social 
Security registrations since 1990), and thus with the biggest difference between the number of 
active participants in the bargaining process and the number of workers fi nally affected by it. 
By contrast, there are no such differences in the Nordic countries (where both indicators lie 
between 80% and 90%) or in the Anglo-Saxon countries (in the United Kingdom the indicators 
barely rise above 30%). The situation in Spain is a consequence of two fundamental principles 
of the collective bargaining process: the automatic general effectiveness of the agreements 
reached, meaning that all agreements that are not company-specifi c must be applied in all 
fi rms and to all workers in the corresponding geographical area and industry, irrespective of 
whether or not they have taken part in the bargaining process; and the legitimacy for bargain-
ing, based on electoral majorities to determine the worker representatives forming part of the 
bargaining committees (companies, for their part, are represented by the majority employer 
associations). The problem here is that there are groups of workers (temporary workers, the 
unemployed, etc.) and fi rms (the smallest ones) that are under-represented in the bargaining 
process, which thus tends to be less “sensitive” to their special needs. In addition, another 
singular feature of the Spanish system is that the opt-out clauses, which defi ne the circum-
stances in which fi rms in diffi culties may choose not to apply the terms of a sectoral collective 
agreement, are generally highly restrictive, preventing their application even in extremely diffi -
cult circumstances for fi rms.
Just as important as content and coverage, in terms of economic impact, is the level of cen-
tralisation and coordination of the collective bargaining process, although these concepts are 
diffi cult to specify and even more diffi cult to quantify. According to OECD indicators, the level 
of centralisation and coordination of the collective bargaining process in Spain has declined 
since the mid-1980s and is currently at an intermediate level (see Chart 5), similarly to most 
other European economies (Germany, Denmark, France, Italy and Sweden, inter alia). The re-
maining Nordic economies (Finland and Norway), Ireland, Portugal and Belgium have the high-
est levels of coordination and centralisation, while the eastern European economies (the Czech 
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Republic, Hungary and Poland) and the Anglo-Saxon countries (Canada, the United States, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom) are the most decentralised.
Spain’s position in these two indicators is fi rstly a result of the principle of the automatic general 
effectiveness of collective bargaining agreements, together with the fact that the regulations on 
confl icts between different agreements signifi cantly restrict the possibility of lower-level agree-
ments amending the terms of higher-level ones. This means that company-specifi c agreements 
are the minority, even though collective agreements may be negotiated at this level. As Table 4 
shows, most collective agreements signed in Spain are sectoral agreements at a provincial level; 
nationwide sectoral agreements represent a quarter of the total, while regional and company-
level agreements each account for some 10%. Moreover, this structure has remained relatively 
stable since the beginning of the decade. This suggests an intermediate level of centralisation of 
collective bargaining, which, in accordance with economic theory, is more prejudicial to the level 
of structural unemployment and wage growth than if the system was fully centralised (as in the 
Nordic countries) or decentralised (as in the Anglo-Saxon countries), as demonstrated by Calm-
fors and Drifi ll (1988) at a theoretical level, and by Izquierdo et al (2003) empirically for Spain.
This institutional framework for collective bargaining means that wages are highly infl exible in 
Spain, hindering adjustment to different kinds of economic shocks. Thus, from an aggregate 
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Sector
Firm Total Provincial Regional National
2000 15.2 84.8 58.1 11.3 15.5
2001 12.8 87.2 53.8 7.6 25.8
2002 11.5 88.5 54.8 9.5 24.2
2003 11.5 88.5 54.4 10.4 23.6
2004 10.8 89.2 54.7 10.2 24.4
2005 11.8 88.2 52.7 10.2 25.3
2006 12.1 87.9 52.3 10.0 25.6
2007 12.8 87.2 52.8 7.9 26.5
2008 10.6 89.4 54.6 6.8 28.0
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COVERAGE TABLE 4
Percentage of workers affected
SOURCE: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración.
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standpoint, wages in Spain have a low level of sensitivity to economic conditions and a high 
level of indexation to past infl ation. In this respect, the results of a fairly uniform survey con-
ducted in most European countries on the wage-setting process corroborate, in general, the 
high level of indexation in the Spanish collective bargaining system and the lower level of sen-
sitivity to the prevailing economic conditions. These results, presented in Table 5, show that 
some 70% of Spanish fi rms apply wage policies that take direct or indirect account of infl ation. 
This fi gure is much higher than in most other European countries.13 In fact, for 54% of the 
Spanish fi rms there is a direct and automatic link to either past or expected infl ation, as op-
posed to the euro area average of approximately 20%. This high wage indexation clearly has 
an impact on wage adjustment mechanisms in the face of different shocks; for example, it 
makes it more diffi cult for external shocks, such as an oil price rise, to be absorbed. In addi-
tion, the process is asymmetrical, as it comes into effect only when actual infl ation is higher 
than forecast infl ation, but not when it is lower.
Regarding rigidities in labour cost adjustment, the Banco de España (2008) showed the low 
level of sensitivity displayed by wages set via the collective bargaining process to the eco-
nomic situation, measured in terms of the unemployment rate. In addition, a very high percent-
age of collective bargaining agreements span several years and are, therefore, even less infl u-
enced by economic conditions. From an international perspective, the results of the survey 
mentioned above show, for example, that Spanish fi rms have much less room for manoeuvre 
than their peers in other countries when it comes to adjusting costs; for example, in the face 
of an increase in the cost of an input, only 45% of Spanish fi rms say that they adjust their la-
bour costs, in comparison with more than 70% for the European aggregate.
However, the Spanish collective bargaining system not only causes aggregate rigidity in the time 
dimension of real and nominal wages, but also a lack of transverse fl exibility, that is, insuffi cient 
connection between wages and other matters subject to collective bargaining agreements and 
the specifi c circumstances of fi rms and sectors. In effect, wage growth is highly uniform between 
sectors, meaning, for example, that the correlation between real wage growth and total factor 
productivity (TFP) for the different branches of activity is one of the lowest of the developed coun-
tries. As Chart 6 shows, Spain is one of the countries with the lowest correlation between wage 
growth at sector level and TFP growth, typical of countries with more centralised collective bar-
gaining systems, and far removed from the Anglo-Saxon countries with decentralised systems. 
This signifi es that relative wages across sectors are a poor indicator of the reallocation of re-
sources that is required of an economy in the event of shocks, providing further backing to the 
view that, in the case of Spain, the adjustment may be a more painful and a lengthier process.
13. See Druant et al (2008), although comparison of the fi rms’ responses between countries may be affected, to some 
extent, by their different institutional frameworks. 
Spain Euro area France Italy Belgium
2.892.19.83.614.83noitalfnitsapotknilcitamotuA
0.05.00.21.44.61noitalfnidetcepxeotknilcitamotuA
0.06.22.127.99.01noitalfnitsaphtiwnoitcennoctceridnI
0.05.10.85.50.5noitalfnidetcepxehtiwnoitcennoctceridnI
8.12.499.954.463.92knilnoitalfnioN
WAGE SETTING AND INFLATION TABLE 5
Percentage of workers affected
SOURCES: Banco de España and Druant et al (2008).
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This section presents a brief overview of some of the most notable labour market reforms in-
troduced in Europe in recent years. It should be noted, however, that as a consequence of the 
crisis, most countries have implemented measures connected with the labour market, de-
signed to support employment through temporary programmes, subsidised, in full or in part, 
by the public sector, and to sustain the income levels of groups affected by job losses. In this 
respect, Spain too has introduced a number of measures, primarily aimed at raising the pro-
tection for certain groups of workers (those affected by redundancy programmes) and at get-
ting people back into work.
Over the past decade, various European countries have introduced important labour market 
reforms, aiming to achieve greater economic competitiveness and dynamism within the frame-
work of the Lisbon Agenda.14 In this respect, numerous policies have been implemented to 
provide markets with more fl exibility and to raise the degree of utilisation of the labour factor, 
in line with the recommendations contained in the Agenda. Below, three very specifi c cases 
are highlighted by virtue of their signifi cance, although it should be noted that, in general, many 
reforms have been introduced in Europe, tending, by various means, to provide fi rms with 
greater room for manoeuvre for adjustment in adverse circumstances, without having to resort 
to dismissing workers or to not renewing their contracts. This is the case, for example, of 
countries such as the Netherlands or France, which have made their labour legislation more 
fl exible, encouraging fi rms to use part-time contracts and to adjust their working hours.
Germany is the country that has undertaken the most radical and extensive transformation of 
its labour market institutions and social protection system in recent years, through the Hartz 
reforms, implemented successively between 2003 and 2005.15 The three main objectives be-
hind these reforms were: to improve the public employment services, modernising their or-
ganisation and functioning; to encourage active job-seeking by the unemployed, reforming the 
social protection system, based on a new balance between rights and duties; and to increase 
labour demand, removing restrictions from the labour market via a reduction in the level of 
protection in the temporary employment segment.16
Recent labour market 
reforms in Europe
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION 
SYSTEM REFORMS: GERMANY 
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SOURCES: EU-KLEMS and Banco de España.
14. For a more in-depth analysis of labour market reforms in Europe between 2000 and 2006, see Moral and Vacas 
(2009). 15. Hartz I and II, on 1 January 2003, Hartz III, on 1 January 2004, and Hartz IV, on 1 January 2005. 16. For 
a more in-depth analysis of the Hartz reforms and of their effects in Germany, see Jacobi and Kluve (2006) and Ward-
Warmedinger et al (2008). 
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The placement system for the unemployed was improved by introducing market-based com-
petition elements into the public employment services. The placement agencies were set 
quantitative targets and were given greater discretion regarding the choice of appropriate ac-
tive policies for the unemployed, made on the basis of personal interviews between the unem-
ployed and the placement counsellors assigned to them. The active policies for the unem-
ployed now depend on the likelihood of their fi nding work. The active programmes were also 
redesigned and are now subject to rigorous and continuous assessment. Moreover, if the 
public employment service fails to offer an unemployed person a job within a period of six 
weeks, this person may decide to go to a private employment service, which will receive pub-
lic subsidies based on its placement rate. Training courses may also be given by private agen-
cies via subsidies.
Regarding the incentives for active job-seeking, the German system is now based on the prin-
ciple of “rights and duties”. In this respect, access to benefi ts largely depends on willingness 
to work. The unemployed are entitled to unemployment benefi t for a period of between 6 and 
12 months; the benefi t received depends on the contributions made. Thereafter they receive 
only means-tested benefi t, which is subject to penalisation in the event that they fail to dem-
onstrate willingness to look for work. To encourage private-sector hiring, two new types of 
employment contracts were created – “Minijobs” and “Midijobs” – targeting lower-paid work-
ers17 and entailing lower Social Security contributions (the lower the wage, the lower the con-
tribution).  Moreover, to encourage fi rms to hire workers over 50, the State subsidises half the 
difference between their new and former pay packets throughout the period during which they 
would have been entitled to unemployment benefi t.
Lastly, restrictions were removed from the labour market, liberalising temporary hires, which 
had been tightly regulated since 1972, and obliging temporary employment agencies to en-
sure that collective bargaining agreements were applicable to temporary agency workers, to 
prevent them being discriminated against in comparison with permanent workers. A public 
agency was also created to help provide temporary employment for groups of workers that 
were particularly diffi cult to place, and fi rms with fewer than ten employees were made exempt 
from statutory severance payments.18 The different reviews of this reform seem to show that it 
has been instrumental in cutting the unemployment rate and raising the employment rate 
[Jacobi and Kluve (2006)].
In addition to this new regulatory framework, other measures were introduced to reduce the 
impact of the present crisis on employment. This has meant that, to date, a great many fi rms 
have been able to adjust to declining demand without having to resort to more redundancies, 
helped by wage moderation and by the enhanced incentives for short-time working arrange-
ments (kurzarbeit). Thus, instead of laying off workers, fi rms may decide to cut working hours, 
partially or completely, for up to a maximum of six months, during which time the State pays 
workers 67% of their former wage. In general, fi rms may implement kurzarbeit, provided that 
their works councils accept the decision and that it involves a reduction of at least 10% in 
working hours for at least one-third of the employees. The German government’s second anti-
crisis package, implemented as from February of this year, extended these measures, which 
no longer need apply to at least one-third of employees and which may now last for up to a 
maximum of two years. In addition, fi rms receive a 50% allowance in workers’ Social Security 
contributions, rising to 100% in the event that training programmes are conducted. Although 
17. The fi rst, for jobs paying less than €400 per month; the second, for jobs paying between €400 and €800 per 
month. 18. This exemption was previously for fi rms with fewer than fi ve employees. It should be noted that the data 
contained in Table 1 refer to a fi rm with 201 employees. 
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this instrument is similar, in formal terms, to the Spanish temporary redundancy programmes, 
it has traditionally been much less used in Spain.19 This may be due to a variety of factors, in 
particular the easier it is in Spain for fi rms to adjust worker numbers by cutting temporary 
contracts. This relieves fi rms from the need to pay severance and shields permanent workers 
from the prospect of job losses; however, it is these workers who are chiefl y represented in the 
bargaining process with employers for introduction of temporary redundancy programmes, 
which will, in any case, entail a drop in earnings.
Austria has also introduced a signifi cant labour market reform, in this case of the unemploy-
ment protection system. In June 2002, the Austrian parliament approved a legislative change 
in severance pay applicable to all contracts terminated as from January 2003, with the excep-
tion of all contracts in force as at that date which would continue to be governed by the previ-
ous system. Under that system, only workers with more than three years’ service who were 
unfairly dismissed were entitled to receive severance pay,20 which rose in line with the number 
of years’ service, up to a maximum of 12 months’ pay after 25 years in the same fi rm.21 This 
was, therefore, considerably less than the severance currently payable in Spain to permanent 
workers, as an employee with 25 years’ service would receive total severance of 37.5 months’ 
pay. The reform was considered necessary because, as the system stood, many workers who 
lost their jobs had no entitlement to any benefi ts whatsoever and it discouraged labour mobil-
ity and investment in human capital, reducing the rate of growth of productivity of the produc-
tive system overall.
Under the new rules, fi rms must contribute 1.53% of employees’ gross monthly wages, as 
from the second month of employment and up to termination of the corresponding contract. 
These contributions are held in a fund in the employee’s name and may be withdrawn, at no 
fi scal cost, when a fi rm decides to terminate the contractual relationship, provided in all cases 
that the worker has been employed for more than three years. Workers who are never made 
redundant throughout their working lives may withdraw the funds upon retirement. Workers 
who decide to leave their present employer will not be entitled to withdraw the funds in cash, 
but they will maintain full rights over them and may continue to accumulate cash from contri-
butions from a future employer. This system, which is still pending evaluation, has, in any case, 
been instrumental in ensuring that all workers have rights in the event of dismissal as from the 
day on which they are hired. The system also enables them to preserve these rights even if 
they change jobs voluntarily, and this should encourage worker mobility between fi rms.
Although there have been no far-reaching reforms of collective bargaining systems in Europe over 
the past decade, there has been a tendency towards greater decentralisation (especially at com-
pany level). This has been evident in the eastern European countries, where bargaining was pre-
dominantly centralised, and in Germany, where the use of opt-out clauses, enabling fi rms in dif-
fi culties to opt out of sectoral agreements, has become more widespread. There have also been 
some changes in wage indexation systems, to reduce their high inertia; for example, in Slovenia, 
where the system now takes into account expected, rather than past, infl ation, and in Greece, 
where the indexation clauses have been abolished [Du Caju et al (2008)].
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
SYSTEMS: SWEDEN
19. Clearly, there are other differences between the two institutions that may encourage this reduced level of use. In 
Spain, temporary redundancy programmes must be approved by the corresponding regional government, or by the 
national government in the case of fi rms that operate in more than one region, after consultation with the union repre-
sentatives. During the period of inactivity, workers receive unemployment benefi ts (70% or 60% of their former salary). 
Firms may apply for these programmes provided they affect at least 10 workers (fi rms with fewer than 100 workers), 10% 
of the workforce (fi rms with between 100 and 300 workers) or 30% of the workforce (fi rms with more than 300 
workers). 20. Save in the event of unfair dismissal, workers were only entitled to severance pay when they retired (and 
then only if they had more than ten years’ service). 21. Each year fi rms were obliged to make annual provision for at 
least 50% of potential severance pay for all their employees. Severance pay was taxed at 6%. 
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All these changes aim to help fi rms survive in adverse macroeconomic conditions, without 
having to sacrifi ce the long-term allocation of productive resources in a free market environ-
ment. Sweden is a paradigmatic example: the problems caused by centralised bargaining 
prompted increased decentralisation at sector level, but the crisis of the early 1990s showed 
that an intermediate level of centralisation was not the answer, revealing the need for nation-
wide agreements on earnings in the face of diffi cult circumstances.
With union density verging on 80% in Sweden, wages were traditionally set via centralised 
collective bargaining without active government participation, even though government mea-
sures affected union strategy.22 All in all, this system resulted in extremely high wage compres-
sion, together with wage moderation that prevented unemployment from rising signifi cantly.23 
Nevertheless, low wage dispersion began to have an adverse impact on Swedish fi rms’ ca-
pacity to attract highly-skilled workers, and on investment in human capital by Swedish workers. 
The system became slightly more decentralised as from 1983:24 this had positive effects in the 
shape of high productivity and real wage growth, it raised the incentives for reallocation of 
productive resources towards higher-quality sectors and it enhanced the educational returns 
[Edin and Topel (1997)].
However, the crisis of the 1990s revealed the problems caused by this intermediate level of 
decentralisation, as wage demands achieved in some industries took no account of the as-
sociated costs in others, meaning that, on aggregate, wage increases were excessive in light 
of the crisis. This prompted the government to demand a return to centralisation and, despite 
its history of non-intervention, a commission (the Rehnberg Group) was created to track the 
bargaining process. The government also proposed a ceiling on wage growth resulting from 
collective bargaining, which proved quite credible as the government enjoyed suffi cient parlia-
mentary support. This strategy was successful in achieving wage moderation during the early 
1990s, leading to a signifi cant reduction in the unemployment rate, but the collateral cost was 
enormous. Public fi nances were severely damaged and the government was forced to cut a 
number of public programmes, at the same time as it raised taxes. In this setting, it was clear 
that workers would not be prepared to accept further cuts in real wages, and accordingly, as 
from 1995, high sector-wide wage rises again became the norm, moderating the rate of de-
cline of unemployment.
Accordingly, the Swedish experience shows that decentralisation of the collective bargaining 
process was positive in the long term, thanks to the incentives it generated in terms of reallo-
cation of resources to higher quality industries and enhanced incentives for human capital 
formation. However, from a short-term view, as the bargaining process remained mid-way 
between total centralisation and negotiations at company level, it proved insuffi cient, at a time 
of crisis, to halt the deterioration in the labour market, making it essential to resort to an in-
come agreement to moderate growth in margins and wages, to make a signifi cant contribution 
to economic recovery.
Comparison of the main characteristics of the Spanish employment protection and wage-
setting systems with those of other countries demonstrates the excessive degree of segmen-
Conclusions
22. Traditionally in Sweden the unions defended wage moderation, supported by tax cuts or higher welfare-related 
benefi ts that ensured that net earnings were not adversely affected [Mares (2006)]. 23. The main aim of wage concen-
tration, in what was known as the Rehn-Meidner model, was to increase the costs of less productive fi rms until they were 
forced out of the market, forcing their employees into more productive employment. The model worked, in part, although 
it also prompted extensive internal migration from the north of Sweden, where the productive system was more tradi-
tional, to the south of the country. 24. When the industrial union Metall and the engineering industry employer associa-
tion Verkstads Förening, which represented large corporations such as Volvo, Saab and ABB, signed an agreement 
separate from the centralised bargaining process.
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tation of the Spanish labour market, which combines very high protection for permanent 
workers with very limited severance terms for workers with a wide range of temporary con-
tracts, resulting in a labour market with an extremely high temporary employment ratio (in fact 
the highest in Europe). This imbalance in labour market fl exibility has adverse consequences 
for the functioning of the labour market, and for the Spanish economy in general, in terms of 
both effi ciency and equity. Possibly the clearest refl ection of this is the intensity of the employ-
ment adjustment in the face of the present crisis, as this adjustment is proving signifi cantly 
more far-reaching than in other countries and is concentrated on temporary workers, whose 
numbers fell by more than 20% in 2009 Q1. This adjustment also entails higher unemploy-
ment: the jobless fi gures have risen by more than 1.8 million in one year and the unemploy-
ment rate by 9 pp, recording the highest level of all the OECD countries. As indicated above, 
this labour market segmentation also has adverse effects on both training decisions and 
productivity.
Moreover, the present collective bargaining system tends to exacerbate some of the implica-
tions of this labour market segmentation, resulting, as has been seen above, in a labour mar-
ket marked by a high level of indexation to infl ation and scant wage sensitivity to cyclical 
conditions. Furthermore, it is an intermediate level bargaining system, which encourages high-
ly uniform wage rises that take little or no account of company-specifi c economic conditions, 
and which makes it impossible for relative wages to act as a mechanism for reallocation of 
resources to sectors with greater future potential.
Overall, therefore, a more appropriate design of the labour market institutions could en-
hance the capacity for reallocation of resources between sectors, firms or regions, permit-
ting a more rapid exit from the ranks of the unemployed for the large numbers currently in 
this position. Improvements in this respect would be vital to establish the bases for sound 
economic recovery, to ensure that when demand recovers it does not lead solely to an 
increase in inflation and limited and precarious employment growth. Moreover, the design 
of the labour market is possibly the key factor in bringing about a change in the productive 
model that was prevalent throughout the last economic cycle. If the labour market institu-
tions are designed so that they encourage firms and workers to take the appropriate train-
ing decisions, so that they represent a correct pointer for allocation of resources, so that 
they facilitate labour mobility between firms and sectors and so that they enhance the 
capacity for adjustment in the face of different economic shocks, then a new more sus-
tainable economic specialisation profile may be achieved, more quickly and at lower 
cost.
In this context, reference to the experience of other countries that have undertaken labour 
market reforms, aimed at achieving more effi cient adjustment to aggregate shocks and en-
couraging human capital formation, becomes even more relevant. The design of the labour 
market institutions must be oriented towards attainment of these two objectives. For this pur-
pose, hiring mechanisms should permit an appropriate combination of employment protection 
for workers and fl exibility for fi rms, to ensure that the labour market can adjust, more effi -
ciently and more equitably, to different economic shocks. This would also result in greater in-
centives for investment in human capital, and consequently in productivity growth. The collec-
tive bargaining system should also be designed to ensure that wage growth and all aspects 
connected with work organisation and worker training are better adapted to the specifi c cir-
cumstances of individual fi rms and sectors, and to ensure greater fl exibility in terms of timing 
of the agreements reached.
15.7.2009.
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